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Abstract
In this paper, we use a non-parametric regression method to com-
pare the transition process from high to low inﬂation with the imple-
mentation dates of central bank independence reforms. In a majority
of the countries, price stability is achieved before more independence is
given to the central bank. This suggests that the credibility of a low in-
ﬂation goal can be achieved without institutional reforms which grant
the central bank more independence from the political policymakers.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the last two decades a majority of the OECD countries have imple-
mented institutional reforms which grant their central banks more inde-
pendence from the political process. Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) and
Barro and Gordon’s (1983) work on time inconsistency in monetary policy,
together with Rogoﬀ’s (1985) suggestion that a central bank with more in-
ﬂation averse preferences can make a low inﬂation policy credible, constitute
the theoretical rationale for these central bank reforms.
Empirical support for central bank independence, to cite a few examples,
has been provided by Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman et al. (1992), Alesina
and Summers (1993), Jonsson (1995), and Eijﬃnger et al. (1998). Using
an index reﬂecting the degree of central bank independence, these studies
found a negative correlation between central bank independence and aver-
age inﬂation. Alesina and Summers (1993) could not ﬁnd any correlation
between central bank independence and other real economic variables such
as unemployment, real economic growth, and real interest rates. As a re-
sult, there is a broad consensus that central bank independence improves
the likelihood of achieving a low inﬂation goal at no real economic costs.
However, this view has recently been subject to both theoretical and em-
pirical criticism.1 For instance, the models by Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Barro and Gordon (1983) does not consider ﬁscal policy. As suggested
by Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996) and Blake and Weale (1998), even
though an independent central bank implement the monetary policy, a low
1For an overview, see Forder (1998a) and Hayo and Hefeker (2002).
2inﬂation policy may lack credibility because policymakers still have an incen-
tive to create surprise inﬂation through an expansive ﬁscal policy. It is also
commonly argued (see e.g., Posen, 1993; Forder, 1996; Hayo, 1998) that cen-
tral bank independence and the commitment to a low inﬂation rule is jointly
determined by social attitudes, i.e., central bank independence is an endoge-
nously determined variable. This suggests that independent central banks
are successful in implementing low and stable inﬂation merely because their
independence reﬂects a social attitude that supports low inﬂation. Forder
(1998b) has also shown that a plausible correction of the measure of cen-
tral bank independence applied in previous empirical work leads to results
that show no correlation between central bank independence and average
inﬂation. Moreover, Mangano (1998) shows that the most commonly used
indices of central bank independence are subject to a rather large subjectiv-
ity bias. Hence, despite the broad consensus that central bank independence
improves the credibility of a pre-commited low inﬂation policy, the empiri-
cal studies that support more independence for the central banks from the
political process are not uncontroversial.
Since the empirical studies of Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman et al.
(1992), Alesina and Summer (1993) and Jonsson (1995), among others, ef-
forts to evaluate central bank independence from a diﬀerent methodological
perspective have been scarce. One exception is Posen (1998) who studies the
relationship between central bank independence and the cost of disinﬂation.
According to Posen (1998), countries with more independent central banks
should have higher credibility and therefore lower cost of disinﬂation mea-
sured as the sacriﬁce ratio. On the contrary to this prediction, his results
3show a positive and signiﬁcant relation between central bank independence
and the cost of disinﬂation. However, since Posen (1998) uses the same in-
dex for central bank independence as was used in previous empirical work,
his study is also subject to the same criticism.
The implementation dates of central bank reforms constitute a neglected
source of information for investigating how central bank independence aﬀects
the credibility of a pre-commited goal of low inﬂation. The purpose of this
paper is to study how institutional reforms granting the central bank more
independence from the political policymakers have aﬀected the eﬀorts to
achieve low and stable inﬂation in 23 OECD-countries. Because the reforms
have by deﬁnition increased the degree of independence of the central banks,
our analysis does not suﬀer from the subjectivity problem that characterizes
the construction of independence indexes.
A non-parametric decomposition of the inﬂation series in three frequen-
cies of variation components is obtained with locally weighted regression (see
Cleveland, Devlin and Grosse, 1988; Cleveland et al., 1990). This allows us
to separate out the long term inﬂation component, the main object of in-
terest, from medium term cyclical and transient variation as well as short
term shocks and irregularities. The long term inﬂation component is then
compared to the increase in independence of the central bank, to investigate
whether this reform is responsible for the shift from high to low inﬂation
observed in most of the countries covered in the study. No such eﬀect is
evident from the analysis, which suggests that central bank independence is
not necessary in order to achieve low and stable inﬂation. The results show,
moreover, that the transition from high to low inﬂation cannot be attributed
4t ot h em o r ee x t e n s i v eu s eo fi n ﬂation targeting during the 1990s.
The article is organized as follows: the next section describes the em-
pirical study, results are presented and commented on in Section 3, while
Section 4 contains our main conclusions.
2 Decomposition of the inﬂation
We have based our study on the quarterly consumer price index (CPI) pub-
lished by the OECD. We deﬁne the inﬂation at time t, πt, as
πt =( CPIt − CPIt−4)/CPIt−4, (1)
i.e., the relative increase (or decrease) in prices within one year interval. This
quarterly measured annual inﬂation should not show seasonal variation and
this is conﬁrmed in the analysis performed below. We examined inﬂation
starting in 1975, because our interest lies in the shift from high inﬂation
following the ﬁrst oil shock, to the low inﬂation observed nowadays in a
majority of OECD countries.
We expect to observe periods of fairly stable inﬂation corresponding to
periods when the inﬂation expectations of the public is equal to the actual
inﬂation rate. We further assume that changes from one state to another
happen smoothly over time. These regimes are distorted by short to medium
term phenomena such as the business cycle, or stringent policymaker deci-
sions. In this context we perform a descriptive decomposition of the inﬂation
time series πt into three components of variation: a low frequency component
5ρt (regime-trend) indicating the general level of inﬂation in the economy at a
particular time t; a medium frequency component γt (cycle-trend) explain-
ing medium to short term variations either cyclical or transient and a high
frequency component ηt dealing with isolated shocks and other irregularities.
This can be written
πt = ρt + γt + ηt. (2)
The various components in (2) are extracted by a two-step procedure.
The ﬁrst step uses a ﬁlter catching low frequencies to obtain the general
trend, ρt, which is then subtracted from the original series. In the second
step, a higher-pass frequency ﬁlter is used to extract the cycle-trend compo-
nent γt that, once subtracted from the series, leaves us with the short term
component ηt. I nb o t hs t e p st h eﬁltering of the components is done with
locally weighted polynomial regression or loess (see Cleveland, Devlin and
Grosse, 1988; and Cleveland et al., 1990).
We will now brieﬂy describe the loess regression method used to compute
ρt.C o n s i d e rπt as the dependent variable, and the time t as the independent
variable. The trend component at time t = τ, ρτ, is then obtained by locally
regressing πt against t as follows. A positive integer h is chosen. The values
of h closest to πτ are then given weights based on their time distance from






for 0 ≤ x<1
for x ≥ 1.
6The weight for any πt is then ωt(τ)=W (|t − τ|/λh(τ)). Thus, weights
decrease as we get further away from the time τ and become zero at hth
time distance. The next step is to ﬁt a polynomial of degree d to the data
with weight ωt(τ) at (t,πt). The value of the polynomial ﬁta tt i m eτ yields
ρτ. This procedure is repeated for every time point, τ,a tw h i c hw eo b s e r v e d
the inﬂation. Finally, γt is ﬁltered identically once ρt is subtracted from πt,
although diﬀerent values for the tuning parameters h and d are used.
The decomposition (2) performed by the above procedure is not unique
and depends on the values for h and d that are chosen in both steps of the
ﬁltering procedure. As h increases the regression curve becomes smoother,
that is lower frequency variations are captured. Increasing d enables more
ﬂexibility in curvature changes, which is convenient when high frequency
components are extracted.
The above procedure is used to decompose the inﬂation time series for
23 OECD-countries. As an illustration, the decomposition for the United
Kingdom is graphically displayed in Figure 1. The tuning parameters used
are h =3 5and d =1to extract ρt,w h i l eh =1 5and d =2are used for γt.
By inspecting the function wt(τ), we can note that h =3 5corresponds to
regressing locally in a window of eight to nine years and h =1 5in a window
of four years. These tuning parameters values were chosen such that the long
t e r mt r e n dw o u l dn o tb et o os e n s i t i v et ob u s i n e s sc y c l e s ,w h o s ev a r i a t i o ni s
expected to be cached by γt. Note that the decompositions obtained are not
very sensitive to small changes in h.C h o o s i n gv e r yd i ﬀerent values for these
parameters may yield a decomposition of the inﬂation that is still interesting,
but for other purposes than those of this paper. Finally, note that we have
7used identical tuning parameters for all the inﬂation time series. We believe
this to be important for the decompositions to be comparable.
3 Central bank independence and price stability
In this section, the long-term component, ρt, is compared with the imple-
mentation dates of central bank independence reforms in order to study
the impact of central bank independence on price stability. We deﬁne that
price stability as having been achieved when the long-term trend component,
ρt, lies below three percent.2 Announcement and implementation dates of
central bank independence reforms are displayed in Table 1 for 23 OECD
countries.3 Note that price stability, according to the time inconsistency the-
ory, cannot be explained by a pre-commitment to central bank autonomy.
If announcement of a central bank independence reform alters the inﬂation
expectations of the public, then it is optimal for the policymakers to violate
this promise when price stability is achieved (for a similar argument, see
McCallum, 1997).
We consider reforms that alter the institutional framework for the central
bank as independence reforms. Thus, a statement that price stability is the
only goal for the monetary policy is not regarded as suﬃcient. According
to our deﬁnition, the price stability target must be safeguarded in the leg-
2Madheva and Sterne (2000) deﬁnes price stability as a period when inﬂation remains in
a speciﬁc range for a ﬁve-year period, and the lowest inﬂation range is deﬁned as inﬂation
below 3.8 percent. This means that our deﬁnition is stronger. Note, however, that the
low inﬂation goal for the ECB is two percent.
3Announcement and implementation dates have been obtained from oﬃcial documents
(e.g., central bank acts,), scientiﬁc articles, and e-mail correspondence with researchers at
universities and central banks.
8islation. However, several studies (see e.g., Svensson, 1997; Mishkin, 1999;
Johnson, 2002; Neuman and von Hagen, 2002) have argued that inﬂation
targeting can be used to solve the time inconsistency problem in monetary
policy. The long-term component, ρt, is, therefore, also compared with the
beginning of inﬂation targeting to check whether the more extensive use of
explicit inﬂation targets can explain the transition from high to low inﬂa-
tion. The starting dates of inﬂation targeting are obtained from Ball and
Sheridan’s (2003) work, which means that the beginning of inﬂation target-
ing is deﬁned as ”the ﬁrst full quarter in which a speciﬁci n ﬂation target or
target range was in eﬀect, and the target had been announced publicly at
some earlier time” (Ball and Sheridan, 2003 p. 5).
As can be seen from Table 1, 17 of the 23 OECD-countries studied in this
paper have implemented institutional reforms granting their central banks
more independence from the political policymakers. For the members of the
ESCB (European System of Central Banks), this may be explained by the
outline of the Maastricht Treaty where their national central banks were
required to be independent before the ESCB’s establishment date.4
The long-term components, the beginning of inﬂation targeting, and the
implementation dates of central bank independence reforms are graphically
displayed in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5. These displays indicate that price stability
has been achieved before the implementation date in a majority (11/17)
of the countries that have undertaken central bank independence reforms.
4The Maastricht Treaty on European Economic and Monetary Union was announced
on 9-10 December 1991, and implemented on 1 November 1993. For a prospective member
of the European Union, the convergence criteria stipulate that inﬂation should not exceed
the average inﬂation in the three EU-countries with the lowest inﬂation by more than 1.5
percentage. ESCB was established on 1 January 1999.
9Central bank independence cannot, therefore, explain the observed shift
from high to low inﬂation. Price stability has also been achieved in Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Norway and the USA, countries where no independence
reforms have been implemented.
Price stability was reached only after the implementation of the central
bank reform in Greece, New Zealand, Italy, Portugal and Spain. However,
the implementation dates were very close to the price stabilization dates in
these cases, indicating that the transition from high to low inﬂation was
almost ﬁnished when the central bank independence reforms were imple-
mented.
For some countries (e.g., Ireland and the Netherlands) the long-term
trend inﬂation component rises above the three percent level at the end
of the period studied. However, the decomposition at the end points of
t h ec o n s i d e r e dt i m ep e r i o d sa r el e s sr eliable due to the lack of data in one
time direction.5 The period of higher inﬂation may, thus, be a short-term
phenomenon even if it is apparent in the long term component.
Turning to the eﬀect of inﬂation targeting, the results show that six of
nine countries achieved price stability before they adopted inﬂation target-
ing. The exceptions are Spain, United Kingdom and New Zealand, but the
transition from high to low inﬂation was in those cases almost ﬁnished when
inﬂation targeting was imposed. This is in accordance with the evidence
presented by Ball and Sheridan (2003), who found no indication that inﬂa-
tion targeting improved economic performance as measured by the behavior
of inﬂation.
5T h i si sk n o w na st h ee n de ﬀect problem in the non-parametric regression literature.
10To summarize, it does not seem to be necessary to restrict the deci-
sion power of the policymakers, as suggested by for example, Rogoﬀ (1985),
Persson and Tabellini (1993), and Walsh (1995), in order to achieve cred-
ibility for a low inﬂation rule. The observed transition from high to low
inﬂa t i o nc a n n o te i t h e rb ee x p l a i n e db yt h em o r ee x t e n s i v eu s eo fi n ﬂation
targeting during the 1990s. On the other hand, more independence for the
central banks and inﬂa t i o nt a r g e t i n gm a yh a v ep l a y e da ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei n
stabilizing the inﬂation rates at a low level.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this study we could not ﬁnd evidence for one of the most inﬂuential em-
pirical ﬁndings in macro-economics of the last decade, namely the negative
relationship between the degree of independence of the central bank and the
inﬂation rate. By comparing the implementation dates of central bank inde-
pendence reform with the long term inﬂation trends for 23 OECD-countries,
we were not able to ﬁnd any signs to suggest that more central bank inde-
pendence has contributed to lower inﬂation rates and price stability. On
the contrary, price stability seems to have been achieved in most countries
before their central banks did became more independent. This may indicate
that central bank independence reforms have been used as an instrument
against future uncarefull policymakers. Moreover, low and stable inﬂation
has been reached in countries that have chosen not to change the legisla-
tion concerning the status of their central banks. The more extensive use
of inﬂation targeting during the 1990s could not either explain the observed
11transition from high to low inﬂation.
These ﬁndings suggest that price stability have been achieved by other
means than central bank independence and inﬂation targeting. The shift
from high to low inﬂation may, for example, have been caused by exchange
rate aggreements, the more extensive use of price stability targets (see e.g.,
Table 3.1 in Madhava and Sterne, 2000) or the announcment in the Maas-
trich Treaty that the ECB will be the central bank in the future. However,
according to the time inconsistency theory in monetary policy, these arrang-
ments are not suﬃcient because they can be violated when the low inﬂation
goal is achieved. The time inconsistency theory clearly suggests that the
decision power of the policymakers must be reduced in order to improve the
credibility of a low inﬂation goal. However, this policy implication depends
crucially on the assumption that the policymakers unemployment target is
lower than the natural rate of unemployment. The periods of high inﬂa-
tion can have led the policymakers to become more inﬂation averse and the
transition from high to low inﬂation may, therefore, be explained by shifting
preferences. Hence, central bank autonomy can have been institutionalized
at a time when the policymakers have a commitment to low inﬂation and
used as a commiting device against subsequent governments.
While the increase in degree of central bank independence or the use
of inﬂation targeting could not be correlated to a shift from high to low
inﬂation (deﬁned as long term inﬂation trend below three percent), this
study cannot reject the idea that low inﬂation cannot be guaranteed in the
long run with independent central banks or inﬂation targeting. Because
most of the central bank and inﬂation targeting reforms took place in the
12nineties, more time is needed before such an hypothesis may be empirically
studied.
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Decomposition of the UK inflation
Figure 1: From top to bottom, the UK inﬂation time series πt, the general
trend ρt, the cycle-trend γt and the short term component ηt are displayed.
Thus, for each time point t, the upper graph is the sum of the three others.
The vertical lines on the right hand side of the graphs allows for comparison
of the diﬀerent scales.
18Table 1: Central bank independence reforms.





































































































































































Figure 2: The general long trend component ρt, for six countries where
no central bank reform was undertaken. The starting dates of inﬂation

















































































































































Figure 3: The general long trend component ρt, for six countries where a
central bank reform was undertaken at time highlighted with the letters
”ID”, for implementation date; see Table 1. These countries, as those of
Figure 4, have the particularity of reaching a low long trend inﬂation (below
3%, dashed horizontal line) before the reform is implemented. The starting




























































































































Figure 4: The general long trend component ρt,f o rﬁve countries where
a central bank reform was undertaken at time highlighted with the letters
”ID”, for implementation date; see Table 1. These countries, as those of
Figure 3, have the particularity of reaching a low long trend inﬂation (below
3%, dashed horizontal line) before the reform is implemented. The starting



















































































































































Figure 5: The general long trend component ρt, for six countries where a cen-
tral bank reform was undertaken at time highlighted with the letters ”ID”,
for implementation date; see Table 1. These countries have the particularity
of not reaching a low long trend inﬂation (below 3%, dashed horizontal line)
before the reform is implemented. The starting dates of inﬂation targeting
are highlighted with the letters ”IT”.
23